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I. INTRODUCTION
The internal affairs of a corporation are regulated at both the state and
federal levels.' Traditionally, state law has taken an enabling approach,
allowing for individuality and choice as to how the internal affairs of a
corporation will be run.2 In contrast, mandatory corporate law at the federal
level compels a more universal approach to regulation thereby reducing
private shareholder choice in a corporation's internal affairs. On August
25, 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") adopted
two rule changes affecting proxy access.4 As a result, shareholders in
publicly traded companies will gain the right to nominate candidates for
corporate boards and have their candidates included in proxy materials
mailed out by the company, at the company's expense. 5 The SEC majority
sees the measures as adding enhanced board accountability and
responsiveness.6
The SEC's approval follows the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,7 which provided the SEC with
the authority to make rules addressing shareholder access to proxy
* Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
'See generally Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement
at Open Meeting to Adopt the Final Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010).
3id.
4 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts New Measures to
Facilitate Director Nominations by Shareholders (Aug. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-155.htm.
5 See generally Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, Securities Act
Release No. 33-9136; Exchange Act Release No. 34-62764 (August 25, 2010) (to
be codified at 17 CFR pts. 200, 232, 240 & 249, currently on hold).
6 David Page, Distilling the Debate on Proxy Access, 1 HARv. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 15 (2010), http://www.hblr.org/2010/1 1/distilling-the-debate-on-proxy-
access/.
7 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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materials. 8 Proxy access is viewed as an avenue for dramatically lowering
costs of an election, and both proponents and opponents predict a
significant impact.9 Under the new rules, applicable shareholders may have
their nominees included in the company proxy materials sent to all
shareholders.10 Furthermore, shareholders may establish procedures for
including shareholder director nominations in the proxy materials.1
There is significant disagreement as to the effect of this proxy access
and whether it is desirable or not. Supporters contend that proxy access
will make board elections more competitive and less of a rubber stamp for
the board's nominees. 12 In turn, boards should be more responsive to
shareholders and increasingly vigilant in performing their oversight duties
to avoid potential election defeats.1 3 Supporters also argue that since board
oversight lapses played a significant role in the recent financial crisis, the
time is ripe for governance reforms that increase board accountability.' 4
While grateful the SEC passed rules making it easier for shareholders to
submit 14a-8 proposals, these supporters further believe the benefits of the
new rules should apply to small-cap companies as well.' 5
Proxy access opponents have a number of compelling arguments
against the new rules. These dissenters feel the SEC has gone too far in
potentially burdening smaller issuers, and should consider amending Rule
14a-l 1 while the smaller issuers are currently exempt. 16  Experts and
commentators in line with this rational also see several legitimate reasons
shareholders may not prefer a regime of ready access to nominate
directors.' 7 They see the new rules as dissuading companies from going
public and listing on U.S. exchanges.' 8 Even if the nominees do not win
their election, opponents argue their presence on the ballot will force
companies to become overly focused on politically charged issues to the
8 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 4.
9 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access 2 (U. Pa.,
Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-26; N.Y.U. Law and Econ.,
Research Paper No. 10-51) (2010), available at http://ssm.com/ abstract=-1695682.
10 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5.
"1 Id.
12 Proxy Access, THE COUNCIL OF INST. INVESTORS,
http://www.cii.org/resourcesKeyGovernancelssuesProxyAccess (last visited Mar.
27,2011).
13 Page, supra note 6.
4 id.
15 See Andrew Shapiro, SEC Passes Minimalist Proxy Access Rule: Small
Company Governance Left Behind, SEEKING ALPHA BLOG (Aug. 26, 2010),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/222380-sec-passes-minimalist-proxy-access-rule-
small-company-governance-left-behind.
16 See Paredes, supra note 1.
17 Id.
18Id.
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detriment of creating shareholder value and competiveness in the long
run.
191
The most captivating argument may be that the rule changes will
impadt shareholder nominations on a much lesser scale than predicted by
conventional wisdom. Marcel Kahan, from New York University Law
School and Edward Rock of the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
have closely followed the goverence questions surrounding the new proxy
access rules. Kahan and Rock believe proxy access will lead to few
shareholder nominations, most will inevitably be defeated, and the
infrequent nominees who are elected will have a marginal impact.20
Further, the effects will result in an increase in company expenses without a
comparative increase in shareholder leverage. 2  These arguments are
persuasive, particularly for large, widely held firms. Shareholders who
engage in activism already have a number of devices at their disposal such
as sponsoring shareholder resolutions, campaigning for withhold votes,
running a traditional proxy contest, or asking a company to place certain
person on the board.22 Kahan and Rock believe that one additional option
for activism may make little difference. 3
It is also possible that while promising some advantages, proxy access
involves significant disadvantages when compared to traditional proxy
contests. Considering that cost savings may be overstated, the limitations
are significant: the company retains control over the proxy card and
preliminary voting information; shareholders can propose fewer nominees;
and the dissident shareholders and their nominees are vulnerable to attacks
by the company.24 Many entities with an interest in shareholder activism,
hedge funds and union-affiliated funds, will usually not even satisfy the
ownership and holding period requirements to participate. 25 While certain
public funds will use the new access to include nominees to unruly boards,
the limitations involved are substantial considering the overstated costs
savings. Overall, and in particular because small reporting entities are
currently exempt,26 proxy access may be little more than a talking point for
lawmakers.
The SEC has placed a stay on the new rules because it did not want to
force companies into potential costly compliance measures while the rules
9 Page, supra note 6.
20 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 2.
21 id.
22 Page, supra note 6.
23 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 6, 28.
24 Id. at2.
25 Id.
26 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 24.
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face litigation.27 However, the SEC has not wavered from its decision. The
agency has promised the rules will take effect eventually, projecting the
litigation will be resolved in the spring.2  These rules, and the SEC's
decision to delay implementation pending the challenge, have fueled
vigorous debate on the merits of proxy access and the details of its
implementation.29 Businesses that will have to deal with proxy access must
prepare for changes that seem inevitable.
II. THE HISTORY OF PROXY VOTING
Regulation of the proxy process was one of the original responsibilities
that Congress assigned to the Commission as part of its core functions in
1934.30 The earliest attempt to give shareholders use of company proxy
materials to solicit shareholder votes for a nominee was in 1942. 3' Then in
1977, the SEC again sought comments on whether it was appropriate for
shareholders to have this right. But again, the proposals were not adopted.32
The proxy access conversation began with new intrigue in 2003, when the
SEC again solicited comments for a proposal for proxy access.33
Under the proposal, shareholder access would be for two years
following a triggering event-either a thirty-five percent or more
"withhold" vote in a director election, or a majority vote by shareholders
electing to make the company subject to proxy access.34 Only shareholders
who held at least five percent of the company stock for at least two years
could make a nomination. 35 Moreover, these nominations could only relate
to a minority of the board seats.36 Republican Chairman Donaldson sided
with two Democratic commissioners at the time in support of the rules.37
27 See Order Granting Stay, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 9149, Security
Exch. Act Release No. 63031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29456, File
No. S7-10-09, at 1 (Oct. 4, 2010).28 Id. The SEC has sought expedited review of the challenge.
29 See generally Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5,
at 24.30 Id. at9.
31 Id. at 21.
32 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 7; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Staff Report:
Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors 3
(July 15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ news/studies/proxyrpt.htm.
33 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 47.34 Id. at 46-47.
35 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 7.
36 Id.
37 See Jonathan Peterson, SEC Offers Conflicting Shareholder Proposals, L.A.
TIMES, July 26, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul26/business/fi-boards26
("Chairman Donaldson and the SEC's Democratic commissioners supported the
SEC's 2003 proposal.").
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After strong opposition from the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of
Commerce,38 Donaldson ended a push for adoption of the rules when he
resigned in 2005. 39
Following this defeat, proponents of proxy access went to the courts.
In 2005, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees ("AFSCME") sued AIG for omitting its proposal to implement
a proxy access regime.40 Following the SEC's position that it could, AIG
omitted the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), 41 and AFSCME sued. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled the proposal could not be
excluded. In its opinion, the court criticized the SEC for changing its rules
without providing a rationale.42 The ruling by the Court of Appeals
suggested the SEC had to do something to clarify the law and remedy the
criticisms noted of the court.
In July 2007, the SEC released comment for two proposals.43 The first
resembled the 2003 proposal. The second would remedy the shortcomings
criticized by the court, and provide a basis for a shareholder proposal to
implement proxy access for a single company to be excluded under Rule
14a-8.44 Each proposal was supported by three of the five commissioners,
albeit with party line splits-the first by the two Democratic commissioners
and Chairman Cox, the second by Cox and the two Republican
commissioners.45 The second proposal was adopted by a party line vote of
3 to 1 in November 2007.46
38 See Bill Baue, Opening Up Pandora's Box: SEC Proxy Roundtable Questions
Role of Non-binding Resolutions, SocIAL FUNDS (May 15, 2007),
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2293.html ("The SEC allowed the
rule it proposed in October 2003, allowing shareowners proxy access to nominate
directors in certain circumstance, to die on the vine due to opposition by the
Business Roundtable and the US Chamber of Commerce, which threatened a
lawsuit.").
39 Stephen Labaton, Donaldson Announces Resignation as S.E. C. Chairman, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/01/business/0l wiresec.html?ex= 1275278400&en
=d89d9d8be5440394&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rs.
40 Am. Fed. of State, Cnty, Mun. Emp. v. Am. Ins. Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 123-
24 (2d Cir. 2006).
41 id. at 124.
42 1d. at 129.
43 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 9.
44 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 9.
45 See Nicholas Rummell, SEC Splits Proxy Access Votes as Cox Says 'Yea' to Two
Proposals, FIN. WK., July 25, 2007,
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070725/REG/707250
13/1036.
46 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 7.
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Following the election of Barack Obama, Mary Schapiro, a Democrat,
replaced Chairman Cox. Democrats now held three of the five seats on the
Commission.47 At its open meeting on May 20, 2009, the SEC, by a three
to two vote, proposed rules intended to provide stockholders with greater
access to corporate proxies and exercise their state law rights to nominate
and elect directors.4s Since then, the SEC has received and reviewed more
than six hundred public comments about its proposal.49 The SEC delayed
action until Congress, as part of the financial reform bill, granted the
disputed authority to the SEC. ° Congress' reform laws explicitly granted
the SEC with authority to adopt rules that require companies to include
shareholder board nominees in company proxy materials.
III. NEW PROXY ACCESS RULE: 14A-1 1
New Rule 14a- 11 will, under certain circumstances, allow stockholders
to include director nominees in the company's proxy materials. 51 This is
the "stockholder proxy access" rule. Rule 14a-1 1 will apply to all reporting
companies subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 proxy rules,
subject to a few exceptions. 52 Rule 14a-1 1 will apply only when applicable
state or foreign law or a company's governing documents do not prohibit
shareholders from nominating a specific candidate for election as a
director.53 Rule 14a-1 1 will not apply to companies subject to the proxy
rules solely because they have a class of debt securities registered under
Section 12 of the Exchange Act. 54 Moreover, companies are not able to
47 Current SEC Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCi-. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
48 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 4. Statement of Chairman Mary L.
Schapiro:
As a matter of fairness and accountability, long-term significant
shareholders should have a means of nominating candidates to
the boards of the companies that they own ... Nominating a
director candidate is not the same as electing a candidate to the
board. I have great faith in the collective wisdom of shareholders
to determine which competing candidates will best fulfill the
responsibilities of serving as a director. The critical point is that
shareholders have the ability to make this choice.
Id.
49 id.
50 Jeff Morgan, SEC Proxy Access Vote Delayed Until Early 2010, NAT'L
INVESTOR REL. INST. (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.niri.org/Main-Menu-
Category/advocate/Presidents-Note/SEC-Proxy-Access-Vote-Delayed-Until-Early-
2010.aspx.
51 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5.52 Id. at 264.
53 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 4.
5 Id.
2011 The Good, the Bad and the Reality: 207
Why the New Proxy Access Rules Benefit Lawmakers,
Harm Small Businesses, But End up a Wash
"opt out" of the rule in favor of a different framework for including
shareholder director nominees in company proxy materials. 55 Therefore,
the rule will apply regardless of whether any specified event has occurred to
trigger it and regardless of whether the company is subject to a concurrent
proxy contest.
56
The SEC's new Rule 14a-ll allows a stockholder or group of
stockholders to include their proposed nominees for up to twenty-five
percent of the board in the company's proxy statement and on the
company's proxy card.57 Any previously elected dissident nominee who
remains on the board counts towards this maximum. 58  State law or a
company's governing documents may adopt provisions providing for even
greater proxy access, but proposed Rule 14a-1 1 will, in the SEC's view,
preempt any state law or company governing document that establishes
more restrictive proxy access provisions.59 Under the rules, shareholders
will be eligible to have their nominees included in the proxy materials if
they own at least three percent of the company's shares continuously for at
least the prior three years.60 Shareholders can pool shares together to form
a group satisfying the threshold, but the three percent requirement must be
satisfied by the date the nomination is made. Shareholders must submit
nominees no later than 120 days before the anniversary date of the mailing
of the company's proxy statement in the prior year.62 Rule 14a- 11 will also
apply to smaller reporting companies, but on a delayed basis.
63
A. Nominee Requirements
The nominee's candidacy or, if elected, board membership must not
violate applicable laws and regulations. The nominee must satisfy objective
independence standards of the applicable national securities exchange or
national securities association.64 Neither the nominating shareholder nor
the nominee may have a direct or indirect agreement with the company
55 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 41.56 Id. at 265.
51 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 1(d) (2010).
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a- l(d)(2).
59 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240
& 149 (2010).
60 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 l(b)(2).
61 id
62 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 l(b)(10).
63 Id. The delayed basis will be three years. Id.
64 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 4.
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regarding the nomination of the nominee.6 5 There will be no restrictions on
the relationship between the nominating shareholder and the nominee.66
The nominating shareholder will be required to file with the SEC and
submit to the company a new Schedule 14N, which would be publicly
available on EDGAR, the SEC's electronic filing system.67 The Schedule
14N will require, among other things: disclosure of the amount and
percentage of the voting power of the securities owned by the nominating
shareholder, the length of ownership and a statement that the nominating
shareholder intends to continue to hold the securities through the date of the
68meeting.
The disclosure provided in the Schedule 14N will identify the nominee
or nominees, include biographical information about the nominee(s), and
include a description of the nature and extent of the relationships between
the nominating shareholder and nominee(s) and the company.69 In addition,
the Schedule 14N will require several certifications relating to eligibility
and the accuracy of the information provided.70 A nominating shareholder
can also include a statement of support for its nominee in the Schedule
14N.71  The company will include in its proxy materials disclosure
concerning the nominating shareholder, as well as the shareholder nominee
or nominees, that is similar to the disclosure currently required in a
contested election.72
B. Companies Subject to the Rule
1. Generally
New Rule 14a-11 will apply to companies that are subject to the
Exchange Act proxy rules, 73 including investment companies registered
under § 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 74 The rule also will
apply to controlled companies and those companies that choose to
voluntarily register a class of securities under § 12(g).75 Smaller reporting
65 Id.
66 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5.
67 Id.
68 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 4.
69id.
70 id.
71 id
72 Id.
73 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 24.
14 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2006). Registered investment companies currently must
comply with the proxy rules under the Exchange Act when soliciting proxies. See
Investment Company Act Rule 20a-l, 17 C.F.R. § 270.20a-1 (2008) (requiring
compliance through Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act).
75 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 54.
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companies will be subject to the rule, but on the delayed basis described
below.76 Companies that are subject to the proxy rules solely because they
have a class of debt registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act are
exempt from the rule.7 In addition, foreign private issuers are exempt from
the SEC's proxy rules with respect to solicitations of their shareholders, so
the rule will not apply to these issuers either."
2. Investment Companies and Shareholder Liabilities
Under the Proposal, Rule 14a- 1 would apply to registered investment
companies, 79 and the SEC sought comment as to whether 14a-1 1 should in
fact apply to them. Several commentators supported including registered
investment companies in the rule because, like other boards, investment
companies must be responsive and accountable to shareholders.8 0  A
number of other commentators, largely from the investment company
industry, were not so sure. 8' Those who opposed the inclusion of registered
investment companies asserted that the SEC had not presented sufficient
empirical evidence of problems in the industry to warrant extending the rule
to them, and that investment company boards tended to have the strongest
82Th SEgovernance practices. The SEC found costs imposed on investment
companies to be less than costs imposed on other companies.83 In the end,
after considering both sides of the argument, the Commission crafted Rule
14a-1 1 to apply to registered investment companies.84
As is the case when directors nominate candidates, the nominating
shareholder or group will be liable for any false or misleading statements it
makes about the nomination under Rule 14a-9, regardless of whether the
statements are included in the company's proxy materials.85 A company
will not be responsible for information provided by the shareholder and
then reproduced in the company's proxy materials.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Exchange Act Rule 3a12-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2011) (exempting securities
of certain foreign issuers from Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act).
79 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 55.
80 Id.
81 Id. See, e.g., Letter from the Inv. Co. Inst. to The Hon. Mary L. Schapiro et al.,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 7. 2010), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/24235_letter-to-sec.pdf
82 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 56. The
Commission noted that ninety percent of funds have boards that are seventy-five
percent or more comprised of independent directors. Id.
Id. at61.
84Id. at 58.85 Id. at 116.
210 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 6:1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
C. The Process for Shareholder Proposals
A total of around 6000 firms are listed on the NYSE, the AMEX and
86NASDAQ, including foreign issuers. Before examining the effect ofproxy access, it is important to examine the current system.
1. Uncontested Solicitations
Most publicly traded companies hold shareholder meetings once a year
and solicit proxies for these meetings under federal proxy rules.87 Further
still, the majority of these meetings are all but routine.8 Counsel for the
company must produce a proxy statement that complies with the
requirements of Regulation 14A. Along with the proxy card and a request
for instructions (voting instruction form), Broadbridge distributes the proxy
statement to the shareholders.89 Proxies and instructions are collected,
votes are tabulated, and the results are reported. NYSE Rule 465 sets the
maximum charges for the principal elements of proxy distribution, although
a number of services by Broadbridge are outside the scope of the rule.
Total costs of annual proxy solicitation typically fall within $10,000 to
$100,000.90 For example, Air Products & Chemicals, with a market cap of
$15.4 billion, produced its 2010 proxy solicitation at a cost of around
$80,000.9 Broadbridge received $35,700; $14,000 went to Morrow & Co.
for proxy solicitation, and $30,000 went to RR Donnelley for proxy
printing and EDGAR preparation.92 The proxy statement itself was
produced in-house.
93
2. Contested Solicitations
Contested elections occur quite infrequently. A proxy contest for
control typically involves mailings to shareholders, telephone solicitations,
advertisements and perhaps litigation. The number of contested
solicitations since 1981 has ranged from a low of three in 1993 to a high of
86 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 17.
87 Id. See also Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Release No. 34-62495,
75 Fed. Reg. 42982 (July 22, 2010).
88 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 17.
89 Id. at 17-18. Broadridge provides outsourcing solutions to financial institutions
and public companies that includes products and services for securities and proxy
processing, document management and investor communication. See About Us,
BROADRIDGE, http://www.broadridge.com/about.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
90 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 18.
91 Id
92 id.
93 Id.
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fifty-seven in 2009, with an upward trend beginning in the mid 1990S.
94
However, with over 6000 publicly traded companies, this equates to over
ninety-nine percent of votes being uncontested.95
These contests solicitations tend to be more costly for larger companies
(as measured by market cap) than smaller ones.96 For smaller companies
with a capitalization of less than $300 million, the average and median
costs amounted to $267,000 and $200,000, respectively. 97 For companies
with a larger capitalization, between $300 million and $1 billion, the
average and median costs were $643,000 and $275,000.98 Even larger still,
companies with capitalization over $1 billion, had average and median
costs of $2.17 million and $1.15 million.99
When limiting the data to after 2005, a recent study of 129 contests
showed that in about half of the contests (sixty-six), the dissidents obtained
some board representation, either as a result of a ballot success or pursuant
to a settlement. 00 Most of the proxy contests involved small companies.
Only eight companies (six percent) had a market cap of more than $10
billion (large-cap), 1' nine others had a cap of between $2 billion and $10
billion (mid-cap),'0 2 and forty more had a cap of between $300 million and
$2 billion (small-cap).'0 3 Thus, micro-cap companies were the predominant
users of proxy contests, with an average and median cap of $93 million and
$66 million, respectively. 104 In total, micro-cap companies, those with less
than $300 million, account for less than 2.5% of the market capitalization of
U.S. companies despite making up a large fraction of publicly traded
companies.'05
It is apparent that small and micro-cap firms make up the large majority
of proxy contests. Very few analysts closely follow the effects of firms
94 id,
95 1d. at 18-19.96 Id. at 19. 57 divided by 6000 equals .0095, less than 1%.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
'0 Id. at 19-20.
1" Id. at 20.
102 Id. See also Definition of Mid Cap, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/midcapstock.asp (last visited Mar. 27,
2011).
103 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 20. See also Definition of Small Cap,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/small-cap.asp (last visited
Mar. 27, 2011).
104 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 20.
105 See id.
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with below $300 million market cap.'0 6 Bob Greirfeld, President and CEO
of NASDAQ, observed this reality in noting that thirty-five percent of all
publicly traded U.S. firms had no analyst coverage. 10 7 Additionally, he
cited estimates by Reuters that from January 2002 to June 2005, 691
publicly traded US companies had lost all analysts' coverage. 10 Almost all
of these companies had market capitalizations under $1 billion.'0 9 Because
of fewer levels of accountability, these smaller companies might naturally
be presented with governance challenges distinct from those of larger
companies.
Among micro-caps, hedge funds accounted for fifty-four percent of the
dissidents, former insiders eighteen percent, and other dissidents twenty-
eight percent."0 The success rate of the dissidents for micro-cap companies
was fifty-one percent."' The highest success rates came from former
insiders at a rate of sixty-nine percent, while dissidents who were neither
former insiders nor hedge funds (sixity-three percent) succeeded in only
twenty-eight percent of the contests. 12 Dissidents in those micro-caps
represented a 9.7% ownership stake, with hedge funds tending to have
higher stakes than other dissidents (11.2%). 1 " Similarly, former insiders
tended to have higher stakes than other non-hedge fund dissidents
(9.2%). 114 In conclusion, only former insiders were very successful in
waging proxy contests.' Other investors rarely attempted or succeeded."16
D. Potential Conflicts with State Law
Given the prohibitive expenses associated with traditional proxy
contests, supporters claim that proxy access allows shareholders to
effectively exercise their state law rights."7  Supporters believe
shareholders need proxy access to exercise this right to elect and remove
106 Justin Canivet, Small cap analyst coverage: an "under-the-radar" dilemma,
WORLD FED'N OF ExCH., http://www.world-exchanges.org/news-
views/views/small-cap-analyst-coverage-under-radar-dilemma (last visited Mar.
27, 2011).
107 Cem Demiroglu & Michael Ryngaert, The First Analyst Coverage of Neglected
Stocks, 39 FIN. MGMT. 555 (Summer 2010), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j. I 755-053X.2010.01084.x/pdf.
log Id.
109 Id.
110 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 21-22.
"'.Id. at 22.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 23.
"5 See generally id.
H 6 Idr117 See Shapiro, supra note 15.
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board members.'8 As stated above, Kahan and Rock's study supports this
assertion: with over ninety-nine percent of elections being uncontested, the
shareholders' role in board nominations is clearly rarely exercised. 9 The
question is whether shareholders wish it to be any different.
Opponents of the new rules believe recent corporate governance
developments and certain state law changes already provide shareholders
with meaningful opportunities to participate in director elections. In CA
Inc. v. AFSCME, 120 the Delaware Supreme Court held that shareholders
may adopt provisions facilitating the nomination of director candidates
without board approval.' 2 ' The Delaware Legislature later adopted § 112
that explicitly allows proxy access to be adopted through a bylaw.122 Under
§ 112, shareholder nominations may be included in proxy materials in a
process of its choosing. Thus, under Delaware law, shareholders have the
ability to adopt proxy access via bylaws.
123
Those in opposition view the amendments as intruding into matters
traditionally governed by state law or imposing a "one size fits all" rule for
all companies.12 4 Despite this concern, and after weighing the competing
interests of facilitating shareholders' ability to exercise their state law rights
to nominate and elect directors against potential disruption and cost to
companies, the SEC was convinced that adopting the proposed amendments
served the purpose of regulating proxy access in the public's interest and on
behalf of investors. 
2 5
As previously stated, § 112 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
expressly authorizes, but does not require, bylaws granting shareholder
access to a corporation's proxy materials to nominate directors.12 6 Section
118 Page, supra note 6.
119 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 18-19.
l20CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
121 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2010).
122 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2010).
123 In contrast to the SEC's proxy access rule, § 112 is consistent with an
"enabling" approach to corporate governance, as it permits each company to
determine for itself whether to have proxy access and to tailor the terms in which
shareholders should be eligible to make nominations, rather than impose the same
"one size fits all" approach.
124 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 11-12.
125 Id. at 13-14.
126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2010).
The bylaws may provide that if the corporation solicits proxies
with respect to an election of directors, it may be required, to the
extent and subject to such procedures or conditions as may be
provided in the bylaws, to include in its proxy solicitation
materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), in addition
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112 also authorizes an "opt in" to access and states that access rights, if
afforded, may be subject to any limitations that are lawful. 127 To'some,
Rule 14a-11 denies shareholders the flexibility § 112 allows in fashioning
proxy access rights. 12 8 The new rules force a company and its shareholders
into Rule 14a- 11, even if shareholders prefer to opt out, such as by adopting
a bylaw permissible under Delaware law that imposes more restrictions
before shareholders are afforded access.
29
Further, Rule 14a- 11 denies a state's ability to opt out of the federal
right of access by adopting a more restrictive right than is created by the
federal rule. The adopting release clearly states: "Also consistent with the
Proposal, companies may not 'opt out' of the rule-either in favor of a
different framework for inclusion of shareholder director nominees in
company proxy materials or no framework."' 130 Furthermore, "the rule will
apply regardless of whether any specified event has occurred to trigger the
rule and will apply regardless of whether the company is subject to a
concurrent proxy contest."'
3
'
Assume a state legislature prefers only to confer proxy access upon
shareholders with a five percent ownership stake while keeping the same
holding period as Rule 14a-l 1 and adopts a statutory provision to this
effect. 132  Notwithstanding the state legislature's considered policy
judgment concerning corporate governance, shareholders could still avail
themselves of Rule 14a-1 's easier right of access. 33 Shareholders of a
company incorporated in the state would have a federal right of access at a
lower ownership threshold than the state legislature determined was
appropriate. If the SEC were to facilitate shareholder's ability to exercise
their state law rights, the final rule would not supersede shareholder choice
by negating shareholder-approved bylaws that are lawful under state law.
134
Therefore, Rule 14a-l 1 would not displace state law as it does by
overriding corporation codes that afford shareholders a more limited right
of access.
35
to individuals nominated by the board of directors, 1 or more
individuals nominated by a stockholder.
Id.
127 id.
128 Paredes, supra note 1.129 id.
130 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 24.
131 id.
132 Paredes, supra note 1.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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The proposed amendments have been criticized by Troy A. Paredes, the
Commissioner of the SEC.136 While many disagree that greater stockholder
oversight could have prevented the financial crisis and recession, this rule
seemsto be crafted at least in part as a response to it. Paredes criticized the
new rules for displacing state laws that already provide expanded proxy
access' 137 Delaware has new corporate law and other states may also have
laws that will be preempted, but that provide much of what the proxy access
rule seeks to achieve, the key difference between the two being the mandate
of proxy access. 138
IV. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS INCLUDED THROUGH RULE 14A-8
A number of shareholder proposals are included in the company proxy
statement pursuant to Rule 14a-8. Under Rule 14a-8, a shareholder who
holds more than $2000 worth of stock for one year can make a proposal,
which is a much lower threshold than the proxy access threshold.
139
Previously, companies could exclude stockholder proposals under Rule
14a-8(i)(8), the "election exclusion," that relates to a nomination or election
or procedures for nominations or elections. 140 Amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
will narrow the scope of the exclusion and provide stockholders the
opportunity to require the company to include in its proxy materials
proposals that would amend, or request an amendment to, the company's
governing documents relating to nomination procedures or the company's
disclosures related to stockholder nominations.' 4' In order to utilize this
rule, stockholders must have continuously held company voting securities
of at least $2000 or one percent in market value, whichever is less, for a
period of at least one year prior to submitting the proposal.
42
136 See id.
137 ld.
138 Id. Paredes stated:
Rule 14a-1 I's immutability conflicts with state law. Rule 14a- 1
is not limited to facilitating the ability of shareholders to exercise
their state law rights, but instead confers upon shareholders a
new substantive federal right that in many respects runs counter
to what state corporate law otherwise provides. Modifying the
phrase "state law rights" with the word "traditional," as the
adopting release does, does not change the reality that Rule 14a-
11 is at odds with state law.
Id.
"' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007).
140 id.
141 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., supra note 4.
142 Id. The new Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8) precludes a company from relying
on Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to exclude shareholder proposals from its proxy materials.
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Specifically, shareholder proposals by qualifying shareholders that seek
to establish a procedure in the company's governing documents for the
inclusion of shareholder director nominees in company proxy materials are
not excludable under amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8). 43 A company may not
include in its proxy materials a shareholder proposal that seeks to limit the
availability of Rule 14a-1 1.'44
Under Rule 14a- 11, to have a proposal included in a company's proxy
materials, a shareholder must submit the proposal no later than 120 days
before the anniversary date of the mailing of the company's proxy
statement in the prior year. 45 Shareholders will be able to submit proposals
for inclusion in the next year's proxy statement if the 120 day deadline falls
on or after the effective date of the rules.' 46 Effectively, Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
will preclude companies from relying on the rule to exclude from their
proxy materials shareholders' proposals by qualifying shareholders that
seek to establish a procedure under a company's governing documents for
the inclusion of one or more shareholder director nominees in the proxy
materials.
1 47
V. ADVANTAGES TO PROXY ACCESS VERSUS TRADITIONAL PROXY
CONTESTS
In considering the effect new proxy access will have on the corporate
form, it is important to highlight the benefits and problems proxy access
presents. The closest alternatives to proxy access are either waging a
traditional proxy contest or to withhold the vote for company nominees.
The first and most obvious benefit are the reduced costs. In most cases,
the existing directors nominate candidates and the company sends
information to the shareholders through proxy materials for shareholders to
make their selections. 48 Shareholders with voting rights have typically had
little input into nominating candidates. 49  While shareholders may
nominate different candidates at the annual shareholder meeting, it is of
little influence as the proxy votes have already been cast. Shareholders
143 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 4.
'44 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 35.
145 Id. at 26.
146 Id. at 24-25.
141 Id. at 35.
148 Proxy Access Legal Challenge: Issue Backgrounder, Bus. ROUNDTABLE (Sept.
29, 2010), http://businessroundtable.org/news-center/proxy-access-legal-challenge-
issue-backgrounder/.
149 See Sec. & Exch. Comm. Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 and
H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong.
17-19 (1943) (testimony of Ganson Purcell, Chairman).
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who wished to nominate their own candidates were forced to launch a
proxy fight in which they mail out their own ballots.
Thus, it is important to compare proxy access to a traditional proxy
contest. The principle benefit of the new rules on proxy access is to reduce
costs of conducting contested election. Again, this is achieved by forcing
the company to include shareholder nominees in the company's proxy
statement.
A. Costs of Preparing and Distributing Proxy Statements in Compliance
with Regulation 14A
Dissident shareholders in proxy access must submit to the company the
Form 14N."50 The cost savings is recognized as the shareholder is no
longer forced to prepare her own proxy statement required by 14A, which is
filled with duplicated and unnecessary information already present in the
company's proxy statement.15' However, the requisite substantive
information is essentially the same. Therefore, the proxy access rules only
reduce costs to the extent that duplicate and technical information is no
longer required. This net cost savings could be even greater if the SEC
removed the requirement for dissident proxy statements to include this
information in a Form 14A. 152
The actual content of a proxy statement can be generally divided into
four parts: the required substantive information about the dissident and her
nominees, technical information that indentifies the issues and explains the
basic ground rules, disclosures related to the company that duplicates the
information provided by the company in its proxy statement and additional
information not required by the proxy rules. 53 Substantive information
includes biographical information about the nominees, information about
other participants and their interests in the solicitation and information
about solicitation methods and expenses. Unlike technical and duplicative
information, substantive information must be prepared from scratch by the
dissident. This information can be extensive and contains the greatest
regulatory compliance costs. The new proxy access rules do nothing to
reduce the cost of preparing this substantive information because the
's0 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-1 (2010).
151 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 35.
152 Id. at 39. Academics argue that the SEC could have, and perhaps should have,
eliminated the requirement of the dissident providing the information. To the
extent proxy access results in a cost reduction, this reduction is unrelated to the
purpose of proxy access and could be achieved without it. Id.
15 3 Id. at 35-36.
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dissident is still required to provide this information to both the SEC and
the company on the newly created Schedule 14N.
154
Technical information includes: the name and address of the company,
the place of the annual meeting, information about how to vote, the record
date, the effect of abstentions and broker no-votes, proxy revocability, the
required number of shares outstanding and some additional disclosures to
shareholders who share an address. Proxy access would definitely reduce
the costs in this arena, but because technical information is limited and
copied from the company's proxy statement, the costs savings may be
trivial.
The type of information that would be duplicative includes information
about shareholders by five percent owners and by management, as well as
information as to whether a change of control has occurred and by what
deadline shareholder proposals must be submitted for the annual meeting.
This information is already included in a company's proxy statement. It is
therefore copied from the company's proxy statement, as is the case with
the technical information. A dissident generally does not have superior
access to this information and it may not be entirely necessary for a
dissident's proxy statement to even contain this information.155 Unless
private information is available indicating the information provided by the
company is false, a dissident could be relieved from including this in the
proxy statement. While this is not all that costly, even the smallest
additional costs that require duplicate material are wasted unnecessarily. If
this reform were enacted, as the SEC has done with other informational
items, the costs savings of proxy access in this regard would be even less.
Moreover, the proxy access rules eliminate the requirement for
dissidents to distribute the proxy statement to all applicable shareholders
and prepare return postage and processing of returned forms. This reduces
printing and mailing costs. Under proxy access, there is only one form of
voting instructions, which contains both the company's and dissident's
nominee(s). 5 6 Similarly, proxy statements and voting forms can now be
mailed together. 157 This distribution is no longer a cost to the dissident
shareholders. But, as mentioned above, there is not any hint that these
types of trivial reductions in costs will create a voice for a group of
dissidents who did not already participate in shareholder activism.
15 8
Provisions in place already provide for these costs to be reduced if a
114 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101 (2010).
155 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 37-38.
156 Id. at 41.
157 Id.
'
58 Id. at 28.
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dissident chooses to forego sending small shareholders a proxy
statement.1
59
A considerable portion of the proxy statement relates to information
that is not required by the proxy access rules.' 60 It tends to take the
appearance of other campaign expenses as it is usually used to influence
shareholder votes. 16' This includes: additional information about the
dissident and her nominee(s), information about the reasons for the
solicitations, business strategies the dissident would want to explore, the
address of the proxy solicitor who can provide further information and
boldfaced recommendations on how to vote. 62  Because these items
function as campaigning, it follows that proxy access does not result in any
costs savings to these items.
In conclusion, the proxy access rules seem to reduce costs only to the
extent that duplicative and technical information is required. The costs
savings with regard to the duplicative information could have been
achieved even without the rules by eliminating the requirement of the
dissident providing the information. 63 In addition, the real cost savings
associated with proxy access relates to the narrow category of technical
information which lasts only a few paragraphs. This information is
relatively simple to prepare by copying the pertinent passages from the
company's proxy statement.' 64 Therefore, while the cost savings of proxy
access are recognizable, they may ultimately be trivial.
159 Recently enacted rules on internet availability of proxy materials offer another
option in which a dissident does not have to mail paper proxy statements to
shareholders as long as they provide notice more than ten day before a proxy form
or other solicitation is sent to shareholders. Usually,
[L]ess than five percent of the shareholders request paper copies.
Thus, notice and access reduces the costs for printing and mailing
the proxy statement. Notice and access, however, requires the
dissident to make one mailing of the notice without any
campaign literature and imposes a ten day delay for the
distribution of campaign materials. For that reason, most
dissidents do not avail themselves of notice and access.
Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 40.
160 Id. at 38.
161 id
162 Id. at 39. See, e.g., Cyberonic, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A)
(Jan. 14, 2007).
163 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 39.
164 id
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B. Costs of Campaign, Legal and Regulatory Expenses
Campaign expenses are typically the largest campaign item in most
contests. 65 They include all materials provided to shareholders that go
beyond the required disclosures in the proxy statement and are typically full
of fine print for the purpose of regulatory compliance. 66 In contrast, the
other mailings to shareholders tend to be more focused on the issues and
information likely to influence the shareholders. 167  For large holders,
dissidents sometimes even make presentations detailing their future
strategic plans for the company and the benefits they expect. 168 In addition,
solicitors make personal phone calls to record holders and other institutions
that are known, though public filings, to hold shares in the company.1
69
The cost of advice, both strategic and legal, are also included in the
campaign expenses. The new proxy access rules have no impact on these
expenses. 170 Even under proxy access, if a dissident is to engage in these
campaigns, the expenses must be borne the dissident.
A dissident's effectiveness will probably be proportionately reduced to
the extent the dissident reduces campaign expenditures. The only exception
is that a dissident may include a supporting statement of up to 500 words in
the company's proxy statement. 17' A 500 word statement is very short to
make both the negative case that the management nominee(s) should not all
be reelected and the affirmative case that the dissident nominee(s) deserves
election instead. While a 500 word statement in support of a shareholder
proposal can be enough to identify a proposal as one of a standard type,
director elections are a much more complex decision. Second, many
shareholders may never read the dissident's supporting statement.
Company proxy statements are significantly longer than dissident proxy
statement because of additional disclosure requirements imposed only on
the company.172  The company can thus easily bury the supporting
statement somewhere in the long compliance document, where it is unlikely
to be noticed even by shareholders who receive a paper copy. Moreover,
the company can use "notice and access" for distributing its proxy
165 Id. at41.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 42.168 id.
169 See id.
170 id.
171 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 29. This
portion of the rule states: "[a] statement in support of each shareholder nominee,
not to exceed 500 words per nominee (the statement would be at the option of the
nominating shareholder or group)." Id.
172 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2010).
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statement. 73 Under notice and access, the company mails a short notice to
shareholders informing them how to receive a paper or electronic copy of
the proxy statement. 174 Under the new proxy access rules, "the number of
[eligible] nominees is more confined."'175 Only the nominating shareholder
or group with the highest voting percentage will have its nominee(s)
included in the company's proxy materials, up to a maximum of twenty-
five percent of the board. 76 For example, in a board with nine members,
the dissident may nominate two candidates. Similarly, if a board has only
seven members, the dissident may nominate only one candidate. Also, "any
previously elected dissident candidate will count towards the twenty-five
percent maximum."' 177 For a dissident who wants to nominate candidates
for more than the proxy access maximum, she may very well choose to run
a traditional contest instead.
Thus, a dissident itself cannot obtain a majority board representation
through proxy access. The proxy access rule requires that a dissident not
have the purpose of changing control or gaining more board seats than the
twenty-five percent maximum available via proxy access.178 Suppose, for
example, a dissident claims not to seek control and makes nominations for
less than twenty-five percent of the board. Then a year later, the dissident
tries to gain control through a traditional proxy contest in the following year
arguing changed circumstances because the board majority has ignored her
nominee. These changed intentions would surely run the significant risk of
litigation. Even if litigation is avoided or overcome, the proxy access in the
following year becomes less credible.
C. Higher Voting Threshold
Proxy access is likely to require more votes to succeed than in
traditional proxy contests, and it may take the support of a substantially
greater fraction of the voting shares to get a nominee elected. "In corporate
board elections, the candidates with the most votes occupy the available
173 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a- 16 (2010); Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-56135, 72 Fed. Reg. 42222 (July 26, 2007) ("Notice and
Access Release"); Amendments to Rules Requiring Internet Availability of Proxy
Materials, Sec. Act Release No. 33-9108, 75 Fed. Reg. 9074 (Feb. 22, 2010).
174 Id.
175 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 44. In traditional contests, dissidents can make
as many nominations as there are board seats eligible for election. A company
without a staggered board can have dissidents run nominees for the entire board
thereby taking over control in one contest. Id.
176 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 5, at 141-57.
177 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9.
171 7 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (b)(6) (2010).
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seats."'' 79 Shareholders can usually vote for as many candidates as there
are seats to be filled (without cumulative voting). 80 "In such an election, it
may take the support of more than half of the shares to get elected."''
l
Kahan and Rock illustrate the above point by considering an "election
with seven candidates for five seats to the board of a company with one
million voting shares."'892 Even if an individual (Fred in this case) receives
the vote of holders of sixty-nine percent of the voting shares, he may not be
elected.8 3 The table below illustrates this point and gives the votes
received by each nominee.184
Nominee Votes Percentage
Alice 790,000 79%
Bill 770,000 77
Claire 750,000 75
David 730,000 73
Emily 710,000 71
Fred 690,000 69
Gillian 560,000 56
Total 5,000,000 100%
In contrast, traditional proxy contests are designed to make it likely for
nominees to be elected when supported by a majority of the voting
shares. 185 This is because both the company and the dissident distribute
voting forms which permit shareholder's to vote for only their respective
nominees.186 While it is possible to vote for some of the dissident's
nominees and some of the company's nominees not listed on the dissident
form, the process to do so is very complicated.' 87 Most shareholders
inevitably vote for all of the company nominees or for all the dissident
nominees. 1 8 Given this design, if holders of a majority of the voted shares,
179 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 47.
180 Id. Cumulative voting is multiple-winner voting system intended to promote
more proportional representation than winner-take-all elections.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 id.
184 id.
"' Id. at 48.
186 id.
187 Id. In order to do that, "the shareholder would have to show up in person at the
meeting and, if the shareholder is not a record holder, would also have to get a
proxy form the record holder before the meeting." Id.188 id.
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and sometimes fewer, support a dissident nominee, the nominee will get
elected.
189
D. The High Financial Costs
When faced with a challenge of a dissident nominee, a company will
often campaign against the nominee. 90 As discussed above, campaigns are
the largest costs associated with director elections. These campaigns, in
effect, spend shareholder resources. As expected, if the dissident nominee
loses, the nomination inevitably drives up expenses.
Given the low costs of making a nomination, dissidents may be inclined
to make nominations even when the chances of success are very low.' 9' If
the chances are low, the reality is that dissidents are making the nomination
with goals other than getting the nominee elected. A board will be required
to expend fewer resources to assure defeat of a nominee with no chance of
victory. 192 However, the increase in campaign expenses because of the
increased proxy challenges is a clear downside to be weighed against any
benefits of proxy access.
Commentators and academics alike have expressed serious concerns
over the price of compliance. 93 When small businesses are eventually
included, the effects of these costs could hinder growth of entry
corporations or dissuade them from forming at all. 194  Companies
accustomed to uncontested director elections may incur substantial costs of
changing their practices. For companies that already have well-functioning
boards, dissent can be counterproductive and could delay the board's
decision-making process. 95 Companies may expend significant resources
on efforts to defeat the election of stockholder nominees, resources that
could surely be used in a more productive manner. To the extent disputes
on whether to include particular nominees or proposals are not resolved
internally, companies and/or stockholders might seek recourse in courts.
All stockholders of a given company are effectively paying to subsidize the
proxy contest of activist stockholders who continuously nominate directors,
having a social instead of profit maximizing agendas, or who are seeking
publicity.
189 id.
'90 Id. at 82.
'9' Id. at 83.
192 IN,
193 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 5, at 63.
I94 d. at 73.
Id. at 49.
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D. Concern for Dissidents' Improper Influence
A primary contention is that proxy access will lead to the nomination of
"special interest directors," such as individuals representing unions or those
with social or environmental agendas. 196 Dissidents may make nominations
as a shareholder group with interests very different from the interests of
shareholders as a whole. This leverage might not be out in the open; but
rather in backroom negotiations. Similarly, proxy access's equivalent of
greenmail can leave the shareholders worse off. A recent study by Bo
Becker, Daniel Bergstresser, and Guhan Subramanian suggests value in
proxy access. 197 The study examines stock price effects surrounding the
SEC's proxy access rule announcements and finds that firms most likely to
be affected by proxy access have experienced abnormal positive gains as a
result of the announcement.' 9" Still, public pension funds, social issue
oriented funds, and hedge funds may have divergent interests and use proxy
access to advance those personal agendas. 199
Some shareholders may be cynical as to why their fellow shareholders
have taken to the director nomination. A common fear is one of private
benefits to the detriment of the corporation. Therefore, shareholders may
not want to have this proxy access used as a leverage tool for those benefits.
Commentators argue that if a corporation wishes to do away with such
access, it should be allowed to do so.
Traditional proxy contests allow dissidents to nominate as many
members of the board as there are seats up for election. Therefore, a
company without a staggered board runs the risk of losing control in a
single proxy contest. The number of nominees under proxy access is
limited to twenty-five percent of the board seats. This limitation creates a
problem for dissidents who want to nominate candidates for more than
twenty-five percent of the board. In such an instance, the dissident will
choose to follow the route of a traditional proxy contest.
VII. STATED PURPOSE: WHO WILL USE PROXY ACCESS?
The new rules require companies to include the nominees of significant,
long-term shareholders in their proxy materials, alongside the nominees of
management. This "proxy access" is designed to facilitate the ability of
196 Page, supra note 6; see also Paul Atkins, The SEC's Sop to Unions, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 27, 2010, at A15.
197 Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value?
Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge (Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin.,
Working Paper No. 11-052), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-
052.pdf.
198 Id. at 14.
199 See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 9.
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shareholders to exercise their traditional rights under state law to nominate
and elect members to company boards of directors. 00 Shareholders will not
be eligible to use the rule if they are holding the securities for the purpose
of changing control of the company, or to gain a number of seats on the
board of directors that exceeds the number of nominees a company is
required to include under new Rule 14a-1 .201
It is fair to assume that activist shareholders who have initiated
traditional proxy contests and proposals under Rule 14a-8 will use this new
proxy access. First, proxy access may substitute for the other forms of
activism. Second, shareholders who participate in proxy contests and 14a-8
proposals indicate a willingness to engage in activism. The two closest
alternatives to proxy access are the traditional proxy contest-where a
dissident submits its own proxy statement-or to withhold a vote for
company nominees.20 2 Traditional proxy contests differ from proxy access
in that a dissident must file her own proxy statement in an election contest.
Rule 14a-8 proposals do allow a shareholder to include proposals in the
proxy statement, but the proposal may not concern director nominations.
Shareholders, who in the past were not active with existing remedies,
may not become more active now simply because another avenue exists.
However, it does follow that those active shareholders may use proxy
access as a substitute for the traditional measures.
VIII. SMALL BUSINESSES: THE GREATEST POINT OF CONTENTION
As "proxy access" is currently constructed, the smallest public
companies-those that are defined as "smaller reporting companies" under
SEC rules-will be deferred for three years. 203  The Commission is
permitted to "take into account whether such requirement for the inclusion
of shareholder nominees for director in company proxy materials
disproportionately burdens small issuers." 2°4 The three year exemption and
the Commission's clear cause for further analysis has caused field experts
to suggest smaller companies should be exempt outright.20 5  The
Commission could then conduct the necessary investigation and approach
the decision in three years as to whether "smaller issuers" need to be
included in the reporting requirements. Instead, small issuers must prepare
for a step that may not be necessary. It may prove more difficult to pull the
reigns back in after the rule has been extended, perhaps unnecessarily.
200 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 4.
201 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 l(b)(6) (2010).
202 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 27.
203 U.S. Sec.& Exch. Comm'n, supra note 4.
204 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 5, at 67.
205 Paredes, supra note 1.
226 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 6:1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
Small boards, which are particularly prevalent in small businesses, may be
inclined to increase the size of the board in order to dilute the power of
shareholder nominees. Small issuers accustomed to uncontested director
elections may incur substantial costs of changing their practices.
Companies may incur costs in attempting to institute policies and
procedures they believe will address stockholder concerns instead of
focusing on strategic or long-term issues.
A. The SEC Deems a Temporary Exemption for Smaller Reporting
Companies Appropriate
Under the original proposal, Rule 14a- 11 would apply to smaller
.. • 206
reporting companies. After the SEC solicited comment in the Proposal
on what effect, if any, the application of 14a- 11 would have on particular
groups,207 it delayed application to smaller reporting companies.208  A
number of commentators stated that Rule 14a- 11 should not apply to smallb • 209
businesses. One commentator argued that Rule 14a-1 1 should be limited
to accelerated filers and that there should possibly be a transition period
where the rule would apply only to large accelerated filers. 2 10 The fear was
that smaller companies would have trouble recruiting directors since the
already small pool for recruiting directors in small companies would shrink
further because directors would not want to risk exposure to a proxy
contest.
211
The SEC continues to believe that Rule 14a- 11 should apply regardless
of company size.212 Nonetheless, it recognized smaller companies may
have less experience with existing forms of shareholder involvement in
proxy access (like Rule 14a-8 proposals) and therefore have less developed
infrastructures for managing these matters.2 13  Thus, the Commission
206 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, Sec. Act Release No. 33-
9136; 34-62764, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668-01, at 67 (Sept. 16, 2010).
207 Id. at 68-69.
208 Id. at 70.
209 Id. at 68.
210 Id. "A large accelerated filer is an issuer that had, as of the end of its fiscal year,
the following: an aggregate worldwide market value of voting and non-voting
common equity held by its non-affiliates of $700 million or more, as of the last
business day of the issuer's most recently completed second fiscal quarter; has been
subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act
for at least 12 calendar months; has filed at least one annual report pursuant to
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Act; and is not eligible to use the requirements for
smaller reporting companies for its annual and quarterly reports." Id.; see also 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(2) (2010).
211 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 206, at 68.
212 Id. at 70.213 Id.
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decided on a delayed effective date for smaller reporting companies so that
those. companies may observe how the rule operates and better prepare for
implementation of the rules.214
According to the SEC, the rules are expected to affect some companies
deeffied to be small entities.215  The Regulatory Flexibility Act defines
"small entity" to mean "small business," "small organization," or "small
governmental jurisdiction. '216 The SEC's rules define "small business" and
"small organization" for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act for each
of the types of entities regulated by the Commission. Securities Act Rule
157217 and Exchange Act Rule 0-10(a)218 define a company, other than an
investment company, to be a "small business" or "small organization" if it
had total assets of $5 million or less on the last day of its most recent fiscal
year. The SEC estimates 1209 issuers to be considered small entities.219
For purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, an investment company
is a small entity if it, together with other investment companies in the same
group of related investment companies, has net assets of $50 million or less
as of the end of its most recent fiscal year.220 The SEC estimates that
approximately 168 registered investment companies and thirty-three
business development companies meet this definition.2 21 "The new rules
may affect each of the approximately 201 issuers that may be considered
small entities, to the extent companies and shareholders take advantage of
the rules. 222
B. Should Small Businesses be Exempt?
Commentators have argued that shareholders of smaller companies
should also be subject to the increased accountability that proxy access
might provide.223  Having already lost corporate protections from other
224small company exceptions , many argue that it is small businesses that are
214 id.
215 Id. at 389.
216 5 U.S.C. § 601(6) (2006).
217 17 C.F.R. § 230.157(a) (2010).
218 17 C.F.R. § 240.0-10(a) (2010).
219 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 5, at 389.
220 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-10(a) (2010).
221 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 5, at 390.
222 Id.
223 Shapiro, supra note 15.
224 Currently, companies with less than $75 million in market cap are exempt from
audits required by the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate-reform law. Publicly reporting
companies and their independent auditors are both required to report on the
effectiveness of internal controls of financial reporting under Sarbanes Oxley §
404. On October 2, 2009, the SEC deferred compliance with Section 404(b),
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most in need of proxy access to "offset the more prevalent dysfunction
found in small company board's governance. 225 Thus, small businesses
are just as likely to have poorly a functioning board as their larger
counterparts.
Moreover, the fixed costs associated with conducting traditional proxy
access are seen as a significant hurdle for smaller issuers seeking to force
accountability upon a poorly governed company, regardless of size.
Despite some evidence to the contrary, 6 those in favor of a small business
inclusion see the costs of traditional contests as a huge barrier to
shareholders and a further entrenchment protection for the poorly run
boards and management of smaller companies. To be sure, "[t]he costs
saved for shareholders of smaller companies via.., proxy access serve a
far greater proportional savings and reform role than... in larger company
contests. 227 Similarly, those in favor of the inclusion argue that Rule 14a-
11 would not impose a material burden on any company subject to the rules
because those companies already have to distribute proxy cards and
additional nominees added to those cards would be no imposition.228
Experts also take issue with the use of "public float" to measure an
issuer's size, rather than straight market capitalization. The proposed
exemptions from proxy access for smaller issuers use a measure of "public
float," generally of less than $75 million. As stated above, the new rules
will have a delayed effective date for smaller reporting companies as
defined in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2. While the determination of whether a
company is a small business is based on a company's assets, "the
determination of whether a company is a smaller reporting company is
generally based on a company's public float., 229 "The more shares held by
those "affiliated" with the issuer, the higher the overall market cap of the
issuer that would gain the exemption and the more issuers that will be
exempted from proxy access. 23 ° Commentators argue that it is obvious
which requires independent auditors to report on the management's assessment.
Fawn Johnson, House Panel OKs Small-Business Exemption on Accounting Rules,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 125735033507128259.html.
225 Shapiro, supra note 15.
226 Some believe that much of the costs associated with traditional proxy contests
are due to duplicative and unnecessary information. Kahan and Rock argue that the
net costs savings would be made virtually trivial if the SEC were to remove the
requirement for dissident proxy statements to include information already in the
company's proxy statement. Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 35.
227 Shapiro, supra note 15.
228 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations Rule, supra note 206, at 69.
229 The SEC expects that most small businesses that would be subject to the new
rules would also qualify as smaller reporting companies. Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, supra note 5, at 385 n. 1076.
230 Shapiro, supra note 15.
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that the more shares held by affiliated parties, the greater likelihood of a
dysfunctional and unresponsive board.23
The following example illustrates the concern: Company A, with a $75
million market-cap or lower, no matter what the "affiliated" ownership, is
exempt from proxy access; Company B, with an $80 million market cap
and no "affiliated" ownership will be subject to proxy access; and Company
C, with a $110 million market cap company but with thirty-five percent
"affiliated" ownership means market float of only $71.5 million is also
exempt.232  Yet with thirty-five percent insider ownership, the
accountability mechanism of proxy access is believed to be most necessary.
"[W]ith such high insider ownership in Company C, above, passage of a
shareholder 14a-8 proposal to establish an even stronger proxy access rule
(where it would seem most needed) is almost impossible. 233
IX. THE SEC PLACES A STAY ON THE NEW RULES
By late September of 2010, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
Business Roundtable had filed suit in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia seeking review of the recent changes to the
proxy access rules. 3 Each claims that new proxy rules would give special
interest groups undue power in board elections. Less than a week later the
SEC put a stay on the new rules, reasoning that it did not want to force
companies into costly compliance while the applicable rules faced
litigation.235 The Commission will stay the effectiveness of the amendment
to Rule 14a-8 adopted contemporaneously with Rule 14a- 1.236 The
Commission did not address the merits of the challenges. Rather, the
Commission determined under its discretion237 that the stay was consistent
with what justice required.238
231 id.
232 Id. The math is as follows: 100% to 35% affiliated equals 65% public
multiplied by $110 million market cap.
233 Id.
234 Petition for Review, Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, No. 10-1305
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2010).
235 Order Granting Stay, supra note 27, at * 1. The SEC found that, under all of the
circumstances of this matter, a stay of Rule 14a- 11 and related rule amendments
were consistent with what justice required. Id.236 id.
237 15 U.S.C. § 78y(c)(2) (2006). Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act
also provides that an agency may stay its own action pending judicial review when
it finds that "justice so requires." 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2006).
238 Order Granting Stay, supra note 27.
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X. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Boards, led by their corporate governance committees, must determine
the likelihood of a shareholder director nominee. A company with very
active shareholders must determine the positions of those shareholders and
whether they are likely to act as a group. Group activism will make it more
likely for a shareholder nominee to be elected. Similarly, these activists
may be more likely to seek the election of a special interest nominee;
private interests include union representation and public policy concerns.
Depending on these determinations, "boards may decide to open a dialogue
with shareholders who are likely to propose nominations for inclusion on
the proxy so as to avoid an impairment of the board's ability to function
effectively.,
239
Experts in the field are advising companies subject to the new rules to
"review their shareholder list to identify which shareholders or groups of
shareholders would have the requisite share ownership.., that would
enable them to present nominations for inclusion in the proxy materials. 240
In addition, a company's shareholder profile should include analysis
reviewing the type of shareholder, size of holdings, turnover patterns, and
length of holdings.241 Lastly, experts have recommended that companies
"revisit how the board's performance has been rated and corporate
governance assessments, such as RiskMetrics' corporate governance
quotient.242
The effect the new rules will have on established state law remains to
be seen. The aforementioned enabling statutes will be minimized as the
SEC has indicated that companies will no longer have the option to operate
under stricter bylaws than are provided for by Rule 14a- 11. Prudent boards
will review all shareholder candidates in order to ensure each candidate
meets the criteria for board members, if any, established in the bylaws. 43
Indeed, charters and bylaws may need to be revised to fit the suitable
requirements of Rule 14a- 11. This review will require documentary proof,
yet another expense of time and resources.
239 SEC Proposes New Rules Facilitating Shareholder Nominations of Directors,
JONES DAY (June 2009),
http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=634
2.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Under Rule 14a- 1 (f)(1), companies are required to determine whether any of
the events permitting exclusion of a shareholder nominee have occurred.
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XI. CONCLUSION
Proxy access is designed to increase fairness and accountability in the
process. However, it is not entirely clear the new rules will produce real
changes in corporate governance. Based on the evidence of Kahan and
Rock, it seems proxy access may result in few nominations.2" Once the
nominations are made, even fewer will result in actual election of those
nominees, with marginal impacts on the functions of the company.
Regardless, the new rules have generated vigorous debate and may increase
shareholder awareness of corporate governance issues. Only time will tell
once the SEC stay is lifted, but the effects may create more of a soapbox for
lawmakers than practical consequences for corporate governance.
244 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9.
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